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SETTLING THE FINAL FRONTIER: THE ORBIS LEASE




The law and economics of space policy have recently become
an important research area. In this Article, the author contrib-
utes to the literature on legal frameworks for outer space activi-
ties, specifically space settlement. Article II of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty forbids the extension of state territorial jurisdic-
tion to outer space. Barring revision of this fundamental tenet
of international space law, rules for human conduct in space
must come from somewhere other than states. The author pro-
poses privately owned and operated communities (proprietary
communities) as a model for space settlement and residence.
The author surveys the mechanisms that make such communi-
ties likely to supply good governance. He also explores a model
lease for such proprietary communities: the ORBIS lease, drawn
up by famed scholar of proprietary communities Spencer Mac-
Callum. The author concludes by discussing why the voluntarist
model would be expected to outperform other models, as well
as implications for state policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
ON JUNE 30, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Or-der 13,803.1 This executive order revived the National
* Alexander William Salter is an assistant professor in the Rawls College of
Business at Texas Tech University. He is also the Comparative Economics
Research Fellow with TTU’s Free Market Institute. He received his Ph.D. in
Economics from George Mason University in 2014. His research on the law and
economics of space policy has appeared in the Cato Journal, the Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law, the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, and the
Stanford Technology Law Review.
1 Exec. Order No. 13,803, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,429, 31,429 (June 30, 2017).
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Space Council, inactive since 1993.2 Under the chairmanship of
Vice President Pence, the Council had its first meeting on Octo-
ber 5th of the same year.3 The revival and activities of the Na-
tional Space Council reflect a growing public awareness of outer
space’s importance, both as a source of economic growth from
increased commercialization and as a potential locus of geopo-
litical conflict.
The resurgence of public sector interest in space occurs si-
multaneously with increased private sector activity. The total size
of the global space economy in 2016 reached approximately
$330 billion, up from $323 billion in the previous year.4 Of this,
about $250 billion—76% of total spending—was commercial.5
In 2017, the space sector received private equity flows between
$2.5 billion and $3.9 billion,6 and this figure is likely to grow
with the continued commercial development of space technolo-
gies. “From commercial launch services to more exotic opera-
tions such as space tourism and asteroid mining, private
enterprise is shaping up to be a critical driver of outer space
activity . . . .”7
The increased importance of space means that space-related
questions that were previously speculative, or even imaginary,
are suddenly relevant. Perhaps the most salient is space settle-
ment and colonization. With the costs of launch continuing to
fall due to innovative companies such as SpaceX, whose success-
ful test of its Falcon Heavy rocket in February 2018 demon-
strated that space is steadily becoming easier to access,8 the
2 Exec. Order No. 13,803, 82 Fed. Reg. at 31,429.
3 First Meeting of the National Space Council, NASA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www
.nasa.gov/image-feature/first-meeting-of-the-national-space-council [https://per
ma.cc/5A3R-4VB6] (last updated Dec. 11, 2017).
4 Space Foundation Report Reveals Global Space Economy at $329 Billion in 2016,




6 Jeff Foust, How Long Will the Money Keep Flowing?, SPACE REV. (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3425/1 [https://perma.cc/KX4P-
9L8F].
7 Alexander W. Salter, The Other Space Race: Some Law and Economics of Celestial
Resource Appropriation, GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript
at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122825 [https://
perma.cc/9T9Q-5FQR].
8 See Falcon Heavy Test Launch, SPACE X (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.spacex
.com/news/2018/02/07/falcon-heavy-test-launch [https://perma.cc/4LN2-
G3CZ].
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question of what human space settlements will look like ought
to be addressed sooner rather than later. The author provides
one answer to this question: proprietary communities can and
should be a model for space settlement. Proprietary communi-
ties are governance organizations that are privately owned and
operated yet are capable of supplying the requisite bundles of
collective goods for achieving good governance.9 The author
conducts a law and economics analysis of a hypothetical lease
for a private celestial community, the ORBIS lease, as a case
study to show the mechanisms by which proprietary communi-
ties can contribute to good governance in space.
Outer space proprietary communities are promising because
they are, by virtue of their internal operation, means-ends con-
sistent institutions for securing good governance. But there are
external reasons—reasons not pertaining to proprietary com-
munities as such—that make privately governed communities an
attractive vehicle for space settlement. These reasons pertain to
the nature and content of international space law, in particular
the restrictions on nation-states from extending their sover-
eignty to the celestial bodies. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
(OST),10 signed by all the major spacefaring nations, remains
the most important document shaping the corpus iuris spatialis
(public international space law). The first two articles of this
treaty suggest significant difficulties for any attempts at space
settlement that are spearheaded or overseen by states. The rele-
vant portion of OST Article I reads:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all
mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimina-
tion of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.11
9 See Mark Lutter, Introduction to Proprietary Cities, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (Sept. 9,
2014), https://fee.org/articles/introduction-to-proprietary-cities/ [https://per
ma.cc/RR2J-4STV].
10 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
11 OST, supra note 10, art. 1.
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Article II reads: “Outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”12 Article II poses the most obvious difficulties for public
space settlement efforts. While colonization seems like an inher-
ently public function, Article II seems to present an insurmount-
able barrier to states performing this task. Space settlement
necessarily entails territorial appropriation, or at least some sys-
tem of control, for the purposes of exercising oversight. Thus, it
seems any publicly sponsored attempts at space settlement nec-
essarily involve de facto extension of territorial jurisdiction to
the celestial bodies. While legal innovations could possibly get
around this restriction, it is more likely that any settlement at-
tempts by an advanced spacefaring nation will be met with loud
disapproval by others on Article II grounds.13 There are also
possible Article I grounds for objection, depending on how the
benefits and interest clause and the free access clause are
interpreted.14
But proprietary communities do not have this problem. As
private, self-governing communities, they do not represent ex-
tensions of state jurisdiction or sovereignty to outer space. While
it may be the case that proprietary communities, as commercial
ventures stemming from incorporated entities within a terres-
trial state, require state authorization for states to be compliant
with the OST, this does not imply direct state control over these
private entities.15 Still less does it imply states extending their
legal reach, in terms of jurisdiction, to the celestial bodies. Pro-
prietary communities thus represent a promising avenue for se-
curing the benefits of space settlement without the costs of
potentially acrimonious international law disagreements.
In making his argument, the author contributes to several dis-
tinct but related literatures. The first and most relevant is the
literature on legal and ethical issues pertaining to space settle-
ment.16 The second is the large and growing literature on pri-
12 Id. art. 2.
13 Alexander W. Salter & Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer
Space Commerce?, 34 CATO J. 581, 582–83 (2014).
14 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 187–88 (2014).
15 Salter, Other Space Race, supra note 7, at 19.
16 See generally Tony Milligan, Rawlsian Deliberation About Space Settlement, in
HUMAN GOVERNANCE BEYOND EARTH 9 (Charles S. Cockell ed., 2015); HARRISON
H. SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON: EXPLORATION, ENTERPRISE, AND ENERGY IN
THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT OF SPACE 260 (2006); Linda Billings, How Shall We Live in
Space? Culture, Law, and Ethics in Spacefaring Society, 22 SPACE POL’Y 249 (2006);
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vate activities, especially commerce, in outer space.17 The third,
Martyn J. Fogg, The Ethical Dimensions of Space Settlement, 16 SPACE POL’Y 205
(2000); Rand Simberg, Homesteading the Final Frontier: A Practical Proposal for Secur-
ing Property Rights in Space, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. 3 (2012), https://cei.org/
issue-analysis/homesteading-final-frontier [https://perma.cc/8USZ-BJ7A]; Rand
Simberg, Property Rights in Space, 37 NEW ATLANTIS 20 (2012); David Valentine,
Exit Strategy: Profit, Cosmology, and the Future of Humans in Space, 85 ANTHROPOLOGI-
CAL Q. 1045 (2012); Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights,
and International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to
Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37 (2008).
17 See generally Peter Jankowitsch, The Background and History of Space Law, in
Handbook of Space Law 29 (Frans G. von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015);
Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle
vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689
(2004); Nikhil D. Cooper, Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of
United States Space Commerce, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (2009); Lawrence A.
Cooper, Encouraging Space Exploration Through a New Application of Space Property
Rights, 19 SPACE POL’Y 111 (2003); Frans G. von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: Inter-
national and National Legal Aspects, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 83 (2017); Mathew
Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier: Keeping Earth’s Asteroid Mining Ventures from Be-
coming the Next Gold Rush, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 202 (2014); Stephen
Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349
(1969); Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating
Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Coloniza-
tion of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299 (2004);
Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commer-
cial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81 (2005); Thomas
R. Irwin, Space Rocks: A Proposal to Govern the Development of Outer Space and Its
Resources, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 217 (2015); Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space
Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 194 (2000); Andrew Lintner, Extraterrestrial Extraction: The International Implica-
tions of the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, 40 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 139 (2016); Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer
Space: A Look at Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, 1
REGENT J. INT’L L. 75 (2003); Tony Milligan, Property Rights and the Duty to Extend
Human Life, 27 SPACE POL’Y 190 (2011); Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space:
The Relationship Between Land Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16
SPACE POL’Y 275 (2000); Morgan Sterling Saletta & Kevin Orrman-Rossiter, Can
Space Mining Benefit All of Humanity? The Resource Fund and Citizen’s Dividend Model
of Alaska, the ‘Last Frontier’, 43 SPACE POL’Y 1 (2018); Salter & Leeson, Celestial
Anarchy, supra note 13; Alexander W. Salter, Ordering the Cosmos: Private Law and
Celestial Property Rights, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 311 (2017); Alexander W. Salter, Space
Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
221 (2016); Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 23 (2005); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New
Western Frontier: Applying Principles of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize
Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121 (2013); Simberg, Homesteading the Final
Frontier, supra note 16; Eytan Tepper, Sherriff Elon Musk? Who Will Govern Human
Space Habitats, and How, SPACE REV. (May 21, 2018), http://www.thespacereview
.com/article/3498/1 [https://perma.cc/E93Y-KWS7]; Eytan Tepper, Structuring
the Discourse on the Exploitation of Space Resources: Between Economic and Legal Com-
mons, SPACE POL’Y (forthcoming 2019) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018
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which is dated but is in the early stages of a revival, pertains to
international relations and governance systems in space.18 The
fourth is the law and economics literature on proprietary and
other forms of private communities, from which the author
draws several supporting arguments.19 The final literature is on
.06.004 [https://perma.cc/5EN6-H9MW]; Fabio Tronchetti, Private Property
Rights on Asteroid Resources: Assessing the Legality of the ASTEROIDS Act, 30 SPACE
POL’Y 193 (2014); Fabio Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization
Act: A Move Forward or a Step Back?, 34 SPACE POL’Y 6 (2015); Wasser & Jobes, supra
note 16; Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a Common-Pool Resources Ap-
proach to Space Sustainability: A Framework and Potential Policies, 28 SPACE POL’Y 166
(2012); Wayne N. White, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 171 (Am.
Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed., 2004); Wayne N. White, The Legal Regime
for Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE: THE FREE-MARKET FRONTIER 83 (Ed-
ward. L. Hudgins ed., 2002); Wayne N. White, Real Property Rights in Outer Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 370
(Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed., 1998), http://www.spacefuture
.com/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml [https://perma.cc/
H4PL-2A65]; Jeremy L. Zell, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International
Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489 (2006);
Laura Montgomery, US Regulators May Not Prevent Private Space Activity on the Basis
of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2018), https://
www.mercatus.org/system/files/montgomery-outer-space-treaty-mercatus-work-
ing-paper-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78L-E3RH].
18 See generally Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Outer Space and International Cooperation,
19 INT’L ORG. 603 (1965); Nader Elhefnawy, Territorializing Space? Revisiting an
Old Idea, 1 ASTROPOLITICS 55 (2003); Philip C. Jessup & Howard J. Taubenfeld,
Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations, 13 INT’L ORG. 363 (1959); Klaus
Knorr, On the International Implications of Outer Space, 12 WORLD POLS. 564 (1960);
Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier, 43 WORLD POLS. 336 (1991); Karl Leib, State Sovereignty in Space: Current
Models and Possible Futures, 13 ASTROPOLITICS 1 (2015); Philip de Man, State Prac-
tice, Domestic Legislation and the Interpretation of Fundamental Principles of Interna-
tional Space Law, 42 SPACE POL’Y 92 (2017); Ian B. Perry, Law of Space Resources and
Operations on Celestial Bodies: Implications for Legislation in the United States, 15 AS-
TROPOLITICS 1 (2017); Mark J. Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer
Space Law, 51 INT’L ORG. 245 (1997); Konrad Szocik et al., War or Peace? The Possi-
ble Scenarios of Colonising Mars, 42 SPACE POL’Y 31 (2017); Per Magnus Wijkman,
Managing the Global Commons, 36 INT’L ORG. 511 (1982).
19 See generally TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION
STATE TO STATELESS NATIONS 9–13 (2017); CITIES AND PRIVATE PLANNING: PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND TRANSACTION COSTS (David Emanuel
Andersson & Stefano Moroni eds., 2014); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS
AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES: THE MARKET PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES (1994);
EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL LIFE (2015); THE VOLUNTARY CITY: CHOICE, COMMUNITY, AND CIVIL SOCI-
ETY (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002); Donald J. Boudreaux & Randall G. Hol-
combe, Government by Contract, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 264 (1989); Michael Makovi, The
Anarcho-Calculus of Consent: Proprietary Communities as Substitutes for the State, SSRN
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non-state solutions to governance problems, focusing on how
communities without access to an irresistible monopoly enforcer
(the state) can provide collective goods and achieve good
governance.20
The author organizes the remainder of this Article as follows.
Section II discusses the problem of good governance and shows
how proprietary communities can solve this problem. In Section
III, the author conducts a law and economics analysis of the
ORBIS lease, which is a hypothetical lease for a private space
community that illustrates how many of the mechanisms dis-
cussed in Section II would work. Section IV discusses problems
with other models for space settlements, in particular bureau-
cratic approaches that would fall under the auspices of public
international organizations such as the United Nations. Section
V concludes by briefly recapitulating, discussing the limitations
of his analysis, and considering what nation-states can do to sup-
port private celestial communities in a manner consistent with
treaty obligations.
II. IN SEARCH OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
How should celestial communities be governed? To answer
this question, we must make recourse to social science literature,
especially on political economy and governance more generally.
The quest for good governance is a search for rules that allow
individuals to live among each other peacefully and to maximize
the benefits associated with specialization under the division of
ELEC. J. (Jan. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294
4516 [https://perma.cc/F969-RZMY]; Michael Makovi, Cookie Cutter Covenants:
Regulation-Induced Homogeneity of Homeowners Associations, SSRN ELEC. J. (Jan.
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194419 [https://
perma.cc/5AUK-QNT3]; Alexander W. Salter, Political Property Rights and Govern-
ance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity, 31 J. PRIV. ENTER. 1 (2016).
20 See generally TERRY ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST:
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER (2004); ELLICKSON, supra note 19; DAVID
FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL CAPITALISM (3d ed.
2014); PETER T. LEESON, ANARCHY UNBOUND: WHY SELF-GOVERNANCE WORKS BET-
TER THAN YOU THINK (2014); STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19;
Peter J. Boettke, Anarchism and Austrian Economics, 7 NEW PERSPS. ON POL. ECON.
125 (2011); Brian Caplan & Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of
Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 503 (2008); Benjamin Powell & Edward P.
Stringham, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey, 140 PUB.
CHOICE 503 (2009); Edward P. Stringham & Todd J. Zywicki, Hayekian Anarchism,
78 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 290 (2011).
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labor.21 Social scientists frequently call these governance mecha-
nisms “institutions,” which can be thought of as the “rules of the
social game.”22 They structure our conduct, render our behavior
intelligible and predictable, and in the best of circumstances,
channel individual self-interested behavior into beneficial social
outcomes.23 All communities, whether terrestrial or celestial,
must solve three “big picture” problems addressed in this sec-
tion associated with governance in order to flourish. The first
two of these can be described as primary, direct problems that
need to be overcome to achieve successful community govern-
ance. The third problem can be described as a secondary prob-
lem. It is better understood not as a barrier to be overcome, but
as a description of what successful strategies for overcoming the
barrier will look like.
A. THREE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
The first problem is the predation problem. Perhaps no greater
definition exists than that of James Madison in Federalist 51: “In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”24 Government—or rather any pro-
vider of governance, which includes the ability to enforce—en-
tails a Faustian bargain.25 To provide governance, which
includes but is not limited to social rule creation and enforce-
ment, a government must be strong enough for its edicts to have
force. But once a government is this powerful, it lends itself to
abuse when the individuals who staff the government use it to
benefit themselves at the expense of the common good.26 James
Buchanan stated this problem in a slightly different way: the
chief political problem is how to enable the protective and pro-
21 See generally LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS
(1949); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund 1982) (1776).
22 See, e.g., Marc Amstutz, Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Juris-
prudence, 9 GER. L.J. 465, 467 (2008).
23 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 3–6 (1990).
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
25 Vincent Ostrom, Why Governments Fail: An Inquiry into the Use of Instruments of
Evil to Do Good, in 2 THEORY PUB. CHOICE 422 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D.
Tollison eds., 1984).
26 Salter, Political Property Rights, supra note 19, at 2.
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ductive capabilities of government, while staving off its preda-
tory tendencies.27 This is the primary problem considered in the
economic literature on constitutional design,28 but it applies to
all communities, public or private. Some mechanism must exist
to prevent governors from preying on the governed if groups of
individuals are to flourish.
The second problem is the coordination problem. This problem
stems from the fact that human knowledge is necessarily frag-
mented and dispersed throughout social groups.29 Although so-
cial scientists frequently treat social problems as an exercise in
constrained optimization, the data necessary to solve the prob-
lem does not exist in a manner that can be harnessed by any one
mind or even any group of minds. This means the quest for
good governance necessarily has an epistemic dimension. The
rules for communal flourishing are not given, but must be dis-
covered, and some mechanism must be available for adapting
those rules to changing circumstances when the need arises.30
One implication of imperfect knowledge is that, aside from
questions of incentive alignment, there is a coordinative role of
social institutions that must be fulfilled if communities are to
flourish.31 There are many ways for humans to live together
peacefully and productively. Which will be chosen and followed?
A simple example of this problem is deciding on which side of
the road to drive. Whether drivers drive on the right or the left
is ultimately socially irrelevant. But it is crucially important that
there be some rule specifying left or right, and that drivers know
what it is. In brief, there are many instances where it matters
more that there is a rule than it does what the rule says. Provid-
ers of governance need to assist those whom they govern to solve
these kinds of coordination problems.
27 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIA-
THAN 95–96 (1975).
28 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
29 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1948); Fried-
rich A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure (Marcellus S. Snow trans.), 5 Q.J.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 9, 14, 16 (2002).
30 Salter, Ordering the Cosmos, supra note 17, at 325.
31 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); Russell Hardin, Why a
Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 117 (Ber-
nard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989); LUDWIG M. LACHMANN, THE LEG-
ACY OF MAX WEBER 49, 50 (Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2007) (1971); Peter C.
Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 148 (1992).
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The final problem is the resource problem. This is the problem
of finding cost-minimizing rules.32 There are many possible solu-
tions to the predation and coordination problems. But not all of
them are equally desirable from the perspective of the gov-
erned. It is important to remember that creating and enforcing
rules is itself an economic activity because it involves tradeoffs.
Rule creation and enforcement uses resources, and those re-
sources are employed only with a cost—the value of the next
best alternative to which those resources could have been di-
rected. Governance providers must solve the predation and co-
ordination problems in a way that minimizes resource costs. In
other words, the best solutions to the primary problems will be
those that leave the most resources left over, so that the other
wants of community members can also be satisfied.33
The above problems are institutional, and thus they must
have institutional solutions. Social scientists reject out of hand
any explanation of good governance that relies on inherently
superior individuals finding themselves in positions to govern
others. Instead, to the extent that successful strategies for com-
munal living are achieved, the explanation must be that the
rules of the game enable the governors and the governed both
to coexist peacefully and productively in a manner that some-
how simultaneously embodies solutions to the above problems.34
A social scientific explanation of how this is done must specify
mechanisms: those pieces of social technology that align incen-
tives and information, such that individuals find it both in their
interest and within their ability to behave in a socially beneficial
manner.35 The next subsection explores how proprietary com-
munities solve these problems and thereby contribute to good
governance.
B. PROPRIETARY COMMUNITIES
Proprietary communities are well poised to ameliorate the
predation, coordination, and resource problems. Makovi pro-
vides a cogent definition and overview:
A proprietary community is an institution in which governance is
provided by the owners of private property to voluntary members
32 See GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY (Routledge 2017) (1971); LIONEL
ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 15
(Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2007) (1932).
33 Salter, Ordering the Cosmos, supra note 17, at 328.
34 Id. at 328–30.
35 Id. at 322.
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and participants. There are two types: land-lease associations and
subdivisions. Land lease entails a landlord’s exercise of sole pro-
prietorship over property leased to tenants. Examples include
apartment complexes, shopping malls, industrial parks, and RV
campgrounds. By contrast . . . [e]xamples of subdivision include
condominium associations and homeowners’ associations
(HOAs).36
While there are important differences between land-lease as-
sociations and subdivisions, these are not important to the au-
thor’s argument. The key is that proprietary communities are
examples of private governance. They are arrangements where
the bundle of goods and services, which collectively constitute
what we call “governance,” are privately provided, based on vol-
untary individual contract, by an entity that seeks to profit
thereby.
Unlike governments, membership in a proprietary commu-
nity is voluntary because individual members have a feasible
right of exit. If a proprietary community begins to operate in a
manner its residents dislike, they can relinquish their member-
ship.37 Within its territory, a proprietary community resembles a
monopoly provider of governance services, like current govern-
ments operating in the model of post-Westphalian states. But
each resident of the proprietary community has a contract with
that community, which must be reached voluntarily.38 This ex-
plicit voluntary element—as opposed to hypothetically or ficti-
tiously voluntary, as in the case with modern governments that
are frequently justified with an appeal to a social contract—com-
bined with ease of exit, renders proprietary communities re-
sponsive to the demands of its residents in a much more direct
fashion than even inclusive, democratic states.39
Proprietary communities, or other institutional arrangements
for private communities that closely resemble them, have been
extensively studied by philosophers and social scientists.40 Nor-
36 Michael Makovi, Government vs. Governance: Libertarianism and Private Commu-
nities, 34 J. PRIV. ENTER. 39, 48 (2019).
37 ELLICKSON, supra note 19.
38 Edward P. Stringham, Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and
Competition in the Realm of Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 516,
521 (2006).
39 See Peter T. Leeson, Government, Clubs, and Constitutions, 80 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 301, 304 (2011).
40 See generally FOLDVARY, supra note 19, at 52–56; FRIEDMAN, supra note 20;
SPENCER HEATH MACCALLUM, THE ART OF COMMUNITY (1970); STRINGHAM, PRI-
VATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19; Boudreaux & Holcombe, supra note 19, at
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matively, Nozick41 and Rothbard42 are often cited by advocates
of maximally voluntary governance as an ethical ideal. While
these works have generated an extensive secondary literature,
there has not yet been significant real world application of these
ideas, at least on a large scale.43 The world’s surface geography
is almost entirely monopolized by states, making the acquisition
of territory on which to conduct experiments in consensual gov-
ernment quite difficult. But as mentioned in the Introduction,
this makes outer space a potentially exciting environment for
the application of private, consensual governance models. At a
minimum, OST Articles I and II will make it very difficult for
states to justify government-led or sponsored settlement
projects. These legal restrictions should not be viewed as a hin-
drance but an opportunity: they offer humanity the chance to
explore alternative ways of living together to achieve human
flourishing. Proprietary communities live up to that promise.
C. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AS GOOD GOVERNANCE:
WHY IT WORKS
While there are many margins on which proprietary commu-
nities can be expected to provide good governance, there are
four mechanisms that merit special attention. These mecha-
nisms explain how those who organize and operate proprietary
communities acquire the information necessary to govern well,
as well as face the right incentives to do so. They also explain
why those who consume proprietary community services (its re-
sidents) act in a manner conducive to the health of the overall
governance arrangement. These mechanisms are: residual
claimancy, club goods provision, peaceful dispute resolution,
and sorting.
The first mechanism, residual claimancy, is the foundation for
the other three. Proprietary communities have owners. These
owners personally bear the economic consequences of their de-
cisions, which is a powerful way to align incentives and informa-
266–69; Leeson, Government, Clubs, and Constitutions, supra note 39, at 303–04;
Stringham, Overlapping Jurisdictions, supra note 38.
41 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
42 See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN
MANIFESTO (Ludwig von Mises Inst., 2d ed., 2006) (1973).
43 Experiments with charter cities and special economic zones are a possible
exception. See Bell, supra note 19; LOTTA MOBERG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: CONCENTRATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2017).
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tion.44 Depending on the circumstances, these can be groups of
property owners who undertake collective action, a single organ-
ization that leases properties and manages them according to a
centralized and coherent decision-making structure, or some
other (albeit less common) arrangement. Residual claimancy es-
tablishes strong incentives to provide good governance.45 If the
owner(s) of a proprietary community do not deliver the govern-
ance services its customers prefer at prices those customers can
afford, then the proprietary community will incur losses, thereby
destroying social wealth.46 In the leasing organization example,
this will take the simple form of costs in excess of revenues; in
collective action scenarios among property owners, such as
homeowners associations, the relevant burden will be felt
through a reduction in property values.47 But equally important
is the informational role of residual claimancy: profits (good
governance) and losses (bad governance) are how proprietary
communities ascertain whether they are providing the right mix-
ture of governance services and whether they are supplying
those services in least-cost manner.48 Even if we assume that the
“kinds” of governance are fixed—ruling out innovation for the
present thought experiment—it nonetheless remains true that
there are multiple ways to supply a given service. If members of
a proprietary community expect some form of “public” transpor-
tation, what form will it take? Rail? Busses? Toll road construc-
tion? Some combination of the above? The profit and loss
system afforded by proprietary communities operating in a
broader constellation of market prices allows those who manage
a proprietary community to discover those governance solutions
that best match what residents, potential and actual, desire.49
The second mechanism is club goods provision. Those with
an economic background may have noticed an assumption in
the above argument: that governance services can be priced.
But, as critics may argue, while this may be true of some govern-
44 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J.
ECON. HIST. 16, 22, 24 (1973); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350, 355 (1967).
45 See Alexander W. Salter, Constitutional Drift and Political Dysfunction: Underap-
preciated Maladies of the Political Commons, in ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY:
THE ORIGINS AND MAINTENANCE OF LIBERALIZATION (Benjamin Powell ed., 2018).
46 Makovi, Government vs. Governance, supra note 36, at 50.
47 Id. at 51.
48 Id. at 50.
49 See generally HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 29; LUD-
WIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1951).
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ance services, it is less true of others. For example, the abstract
good “law and order” seems to have an element of publicness
about it. If this is so, then it is difficult to price the good and
meter it out only to those who pay. If those who do not pay for
the proprietary community’s services can nonetheless enjoy
them, then customers have no incentive to pay. Thus, proprie-
tary communities are seemingly left without a way to acquire rev-
enue. Fortunately, there is a way around this objection. Good
governance is not a public good, but a club good.50 Because the
benefits associated with good governance are spatially demar-
cated—they inherently attach to specific blocks of physical
space, such as real estate—governance can be priced by bun-
dling the provision of physical territory with the governance ser-
vices to be enjoyed.51 These broader benefits associated with
good governance can be priced into the value of the proprietary
community’s real estate (and hence the lease rate as well, pro-
vided the proprietary community embraces that sort of a
model).52 In fact, it is precisely the club-like nature of govern-
ance services that make proprietary communities both feasible
and attractive as a governance model. This also has implications
for tenant or owner-association member behavior: if residents
are behaving in a way that imposes costs on others, those in
charge of operating the proprietary community have the ability
and the incentive to intervene to stop the costly behavior by
resolving the underlying conflict in whatever contributes to the
continued viability and profitability of the community.53
This segues naturally into peaceful dispute resolution, the
third mechanism. Whenever human beings reside in close
quarters and interact regularly, they will occasionally come into
conflict. Good governance involves ameliorating and resolving
these conflicts in a low-cost way.54 This almost always means as
peaceful a way as possible. Violence is socially costly; the re-
sources spent engaging in violence may be privately beneficial
for the wielder of violence, but because those resources have an
opportunity cost, society is poorer by the real goods and services
that could have been produced with the resources that instead
50 James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1–2
(1965).
51 Leeson, Government, Clubs, and Constitutions, supra note 39, at 307.
52 Makovi, Government vs. Governance, supra note 36, at 51.
53 Id. at 50.
54 Salter, Ordering the Cosmos, supra note 17, at 327.
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went into violence.55 And, of course, violence has the potential
to actively destroy wealth, such as in the event of wars, which
waste large quantities of labor, capital, and natural resources.
Humans make recourse to violence because it is a simple and
obvious dispute resolution technology. Although we dislike it,
“might makes right” is a viable rule for settling disputes, as
thousands of years of human history attest. But it is not a viable
rule for settling disputes if our goal is widespread human flour-
ishing, of the kind enjoyed by the Western nations beginning
with the Industrial Revolution. One of the most important func-
tions of a proprietary community is to provide an overall frame-
work of rules that is conducive to peaceful dispute resolution.56
By having a publicly available list of rules and providing a fair
process for adjudicating disputes over when and how those rules
have been breached—a function that embodies the ideal of the
rule of law57—proprietary communities help solve one of the
omnipresent dilemmas confronting human beings acting in
groups, and in a context where the proprietary community or-
ganizers have the incentives and information to maintain both
an efficient and equitable dispute resolution process.58
The final mechanism is sorting. Not all individuals will have
the same tastes regarding governance. Some will want to live in a
community that offers more extensive services with either
higher property costs or lease prices; others will prefer more
minimalist schemes, which will be reflected in lower property
costs or lease prices.59 For example, some proprietary communi-
ties may choose to insure residents for fire, theft, or property
damage, while others do not. Property costs and lease prices will
be higher for those that do, all else being equal. Individuals who
are more risk averse can self-sort into these kinds of communi-
ties, while others with greater taste for risk can self-sort into
communities that do not bundle residence with these particular
insurance schemes. In brief, because proprietary communities
are voluntary, individuals will find they can self-sort into the pro-
prietary community that provides their most preferred bundle
of governance services at a given price. Economists call this “Tie-
55 See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 ECON.
INQUIRY 224, 230–31 (1967).
56 Salter, Ordering the Cosmos, supra note 17, at 328–29.
57 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 170–73 (1960).
58 Salter, Ordering the Cosmos, supra note 17, at 327–28.
59 Makovi, Anarcho-Calculus of Consent, supra note 19, at 14.
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bout competition,” or “voting with one’s feet.”60 In addition to
Tiebout competition, there is pseudo-Tiebout competition,
which is Tiebout competition extended into the time dimen-
sion.61 Over time, individuals can move/switch communities if
they find that other communities start offering a better deal.
Both Tiebout and pseudo-Tiebout competition contribute to
good governance by giving proprietary community residents
what they want, either due to abstract preferences or due to
competition between communities trying to attract additional
residents.62
It is important to note that the efficacy of any of these mecha-
nisms varies depending on the circumstances of time and place.
At least in the early stages of space settlement, Tiebout and
pseudo-Tiebout competition are probably not going to be all
that important (except in comparison to, and in competition
with, ordinary terrestrial communities). Nonetheless they all are
worth mentioning because these four mechanisms offer a pow-
erful explanation of why and how proprietary communities will
govern in the interests of their residents.
III. FROM PRACTICAL THEORY TO THEORETICAL
PRACTICE: THE ORBIS LEASE
The ORBIS lease was written by Spencer H. MacCallum, a
noted scholar of private governance and proprietary communi-
ties, and the grandson of Spencer Heath, whose Citadel, Market
and Altar was itself a pioneering analysis of voluntary societies.63
Following his grandfather’s vision, MacCallum intended the
ORBIS lease to be a practical outline for the establishment of a
voluntary community.64 The goal is an explicit contractual com-
munity, where institutionalized coercion (such as taxation and
policing) is eliminated, and sporadic coercion (such as violence
among residents) is minimized.65
60 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956); see also Jim Fedako, Voting with Our Feet? Local Government “Ser-
vices” and the Supposed Tiebout Effect, MISES INST. (May 29, 2016), https://mises
.org/library/voting-our-feet-local-government-services-and-supposed-tiebout-ef
fect [https://perma.cc/EAE5-P5DT] (last updated June 18, 2018).
61 See generally Tiebout, supra note 60.
62 Boudreaux & Holcombe, supra note 19, at 276.
63 See Spencer H. MacCallum, A Model Lease for ORBIS, 81 VOLUNTARYIST 1, 1
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The author’s purpose is to focus on the economic mecha-
nisms—specifically the ones highlighted in Section II of this Ar-
ticle—rather than to conduct an exhaustive analysis. The author
encourages the reader to follow along, consulting the endnotes
throughout the lease for helpful background information re-
garding the how the various covenants within the lease are re-
lated to existing legal traditions, as well as for explanations of
the rationales behind particular covenants.
The first content of note is in the Editor’s Note that precedes
the lease. Here, the editor, quoting from a private document
written by MacCallum sometime after the ORBIS lease, repro-
duces MacCallum’s thoughts on the basic principles underlying
the covenants within the lease. These principles serve as a her-
meneutical key for understanding the document as a whole:
1. Public services amply provided through exclusively free-
market enterprises without resort to taxation.
2. Community administrators exercising little or no police
function.
3. Personal interests of the owners and administrators of the
community aligned with the public interest, the common
good of the whole community.
4. Flexibility of land use, permitting changes to take place
incrementally over time without prejudice to contracted
rights.
5. An exact standard by which to determine and measure
quantitatively the “good of the community.”
6. A cultural bias toward settling differences creatively by
means that do not include resorting to physical force.
7. A competitive market free of any and all coercive re-
straints on trade.66
We now turn to the lease proper. The lease is divided into
four sections, each focusing on a different aspect of the lessor-
lessee relationship. Section I establishes the nature of the
ORBIS community and states its fundamental tenets;67 Section
II contains the specific promises and guarantees ORBIS makes
to its leaseholders;68 Section III contains the specific promises
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2.
68 Id. at 2–3.
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the leaseholders make to ORBIS in turn;69 and Section IV details
tertiary details and commitments.70
Section I explicitly establishes ORBIS as a proprietary commu-
nity on the lend-lease model (as opposed to the subdivision
model):
O[RBIS] is engaged in the business of developing, maintaining
and promoting the growth of human environments conducive to
the fullest enjoyment of community living, and of marketing
such environments by leasing to its members exclusive sites
through the occupancy of which they can obtain full access to
and enjoyment of the same . . . .71
The lease is conveyed “in perpetuity to P [the leaseholder], his
heirs and assigns, subject to the terms and conditions of this
agreement, full membership in the community of O[RBIS],”
which includes exclusive occupancy of a specific physical loca-
tion, as well as access to common areas, facilities, and
amenities.72
Section II, which contains six Covenants A–F, focuses on
ORBIS’s obligation to the leaseholder.73 Because it defines and
limits the scope of governance, it can be thought of as the pri-
vate analogue of the public constitutions that underlie many lib-
eral democracies. Covenant A contains the important provision
that ORBIS “promises not to impose or permit to be imposed
within O[RBIS] any tax on the person or property of P or of
anyone else in O[RBIS].”74 Covenants B and C pertain to the
production and distribution by ORBIS of important information
related to residence within the community, such as health and
safety, insurance, technologies for nuisance abatement, and pri-
vate arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.75 Covenant
B(2) also explicitly contains a reimbursement provision:
[T]hrough rent remission or otherwise, of uninsured losses re-
sulting from fire, theft, or bodily injury suffered in the public
areas of O[RBIS], or in the private areas when said fire, theft or
attack originated outside those areas and was not caused by the
negligence of P or his tenants, guests or invitees.76
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id. at 3–4.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2–3.
74 Id. at 2.
75 Id. at 2 & 5 n.2.
76 Id. at 2.
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Here, we see provisions for the production of two important
goods, information and security, which are typically theorized in
economics as goods with significant positive external benefits.
Furthermore, because these benefits are supposedly non-exclud-
able, meaning it is infeasible to prevent those who do not pay
for information from acquiring it, for example, the production
of information is held to be an inherently public function,
which private markets are not well equipped to handle. These
provisions of the lease demonstrate that orthodox theorists lack
imagination: it is possible for private entities to profit from the
production of public goods, such as information or security, by
bundling those goods with other goods that are excludable on
the basis of payment. In this case, the bundled good is member-
ship within the community, and the profitability of ORBIS’s bus-
iness model is the standard according to which the value of any
particular bit of information or any particular security provision
is judged.
Covenant C promises the collection and publication of infor-
mation about marketing and land-use values, which serves as a
segue to the important following covenant.77 Covenant D con-
tains the provisions for land-use readjustment: the terms on
which ORBIS can repossess the leased property to allocate it to a
higher-valued use.78 This is obviously a risky function, given the
power imbalance that frequently characterizes lessor-lessee rela-
tionships. To guard against this—which, if ORBIS did not, no-
body would have much an incentive to live there—ORBIS
promises to (1) give leaseholders no less than two years notice;
(2) grant leaseholders the first right of refusal by meeting
ORBIS’s proposed altered terms; (3) offer the leaseholder alter-
native space within the community; (4) reimburse the full ap-
praised market value to the property made by the leaseholder;
(5) pay the leaseholder’s personal and professional moving
costs; and (6) compensate the leaseholder for any loss of busi-
ness revenue (if the leaseholder used the property for commer-
cial purposes) during the relocation.79
The final two Covenants, E and F, are very important because
they explicitly state the criteria ORBIS will employ in making its
decisions concerning property allocation, as well as what guaran-
tees leaseholders have against negligence or abuse. Covenant E
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2–3.
79 Id.
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obliges ORBIS “[t]o conduct its business always in a manner cal-
culated to maximize the total value, as income property, of its
basic productive capital consisting of the site of O[RBIS].”80
Covenant F obliges ORBIS to “have in effect at all times ade-
quate insurance or reserves specifically to compensate P for any
loss or inconvenience that P might suffer as a result of ORBI-
TAL [the name used throughout for the corporate owner of
ORBIS] violating any of the terms of this agreement.”81 Cove-
nant E establishes the importance and function of ownership as
expressed in residual claimancy. The endnote to the covenant
states the purpose of this covenant clearly and concisely:
The ultimate protection of the members is that Orbital will be
operated as a business and hence more rationally than if it were
not. If it were operated for any other reason—ideological, chari-
table or whatnot—there would not be this protection. The im-
personal, rational pricing mechanism of the market is the
ultimate safeguard of justice in a civilized community. The rental
income from a proprietary community affords a quantitative measure of
its success as a community and a yardstick by which to measure proposed
improvements.82
Section III contains the covenants by leaseholders to ORBIS.83
Explicit promises of citizens to governments are rare in political
constitutions. But it is a standard feature of private contracts.
This section concretizes the ORBIS lease as a private constitu-
tion—an actual, as opposed to a fictitious, social contract. The
Section contains nine Covenants A–J.84 Some of these are basic
provisions concerning the due date for rent payments, the duty
to avoid injuring or causing a nuisance towards other residents,
and to carry liability insurance (the converse of the claims which
ORBIS guarantees it will insure).
The final two Covenants, H and J, are particularly important.
Covenant H requires residents to “refrain absolutely from en-
gaging in collusion in restraint of trade . . . .”85 Subpoint 1 of the
covenant further requires residents “seek every means of avoid-
ing the use or threat of physical force against any person, for
whatever reason . . . .”86 These covenants are linked for a reason:
80 Id. at 3.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 5 n.6 (emphasis added).
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collusion in restraint of trade, enforced by violence, represents a
double source of economic inefficiency. First is the inefficiency
resulting from monopoly—under-production and over-charg-
ing—well known to all economists. Second is the inefficiency
that arises from investing resources in the capacity to wield vio-
lence, itself wasteful because those resources are used not in the
service of production but of redistribution. As a private commu-
nity intent on making its residence as pleasant a place to live as
possible, thereby contributing to its bottom line, ORBIS obvi-
ously has an incentive to prohibit such behavior.
Covenant J requires that a resident “be responsible at all times
for the actions of his tenants, guests or invitees as if those ac-
tions were his own.”87 This is a modern form of a personal
surety, where the reputation of a group member serves as a
“bond” guaranteeing the adherence to group standards of
guests. Since it is infeasible even for a private community to
make rules covering every contingency, making residents re-
sponsible for guest infractions of the rules ex post places an ex
ante burden on the resident to ensure compliance. This is the
least-cost option for the division of authority between ORBIS
and its residents regarding the behavior of guests, the employ-
ment of which contributes to collective wealth maximization
and, hence, the welfare of the community.
The fourth and final section adds additional content to the
previous sections and their covenants.88 Some of the covenants
in this section are miscellaneous, but many contain important
provisions that specify how certain governance arrangements
will function. There are five covenants in this section. The first
few deal with the terms of use and rental, specifying the resi-
dent’s property is completely within the resident’s discretion
with respect to use (subject to the other terms and conditions in
the lease) and detailing the process by which rents will be reeval-
uated and marked to market.89 This includes covenants dealing
with arrears and eviction, as well as conditions for termination
of the lease.90
Covenant D is particularly important because it states pre-
cisely the conditions under which the leaseholder may termi-
nate the agreement and the conditions under which ORBIS may
87 Id.
88 Id. at 3–4.
89 Id. at 3.
90 Id. at 4.
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terminate the agreement.91 If the agreement is terminated by
the resident due to neglect or abuse, ORBIS promises to “safely
transport P and anyone else residing at the time on P’s prem-
ises, together with their personal belongings, to any place of
their choosing.”92 This is noteworthy because it partly mitigates
the power imbalance between lessor and lessee by explicitly
committing to a procedure that facilitates Tiebout and pseudo-
Tiebout competition. This helps ORBIS maximize its rental in-
come, and hence its capital value; presumably this commitment
to help residents exit in the case of neglect or abuse increases
their willingness to reside within ORBIS in the first place.
The final Covenant E is worth quoting in full:
That any dispute with any person in O[RBIS] that cannot be re-
solved informally by the parties to it, including any dispute that
might arise over the terms of this lease or the performance of
either party to it, shall be settled by a mediator or, failing that, a
neutral arbitrator in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the XYZ Arbitration Association [a filler for a particular organiza-
tion to be specified later]. The parties agree to be bound by the
decisions of the arbitrator.93
This final covenant matters a great deal. It is essentially a repudi-
ation of sovereignty, at least in the familiar (post-Westphalian)
sense. ORBIS here relinquishes any claim to be the sole deci-
sion-making authority within its jurisdiction, as well as the sole
arbitrator of disputes. By committing to an arbitration proce-
dure, ORBIS provides residents another powerful check on the
possibility of predation. Of course, ORBIS could in theory ig-
nore this covenant ex post, as well as any other covenants in the
lease. However, the likelihood of this is extremely low.
First, because ORBIS is privately owned and operated for a
profit, if it reneges on its agreements, its reputation will be tar-
nished. Demand for residence within ORBIS will fall, resulting
in a decrease in capital (property) value and, hence, future prof-
itability. The only scenario in which ORBIS would find this prof-
itable is if the one-time payoff from cheating, preying on, or
otherwise abusing its residents is sufficiently high to outweigh
the future foregone profits that will follow once it becomes pub-
lic knowledge that ORBIS cannot be trusted. Because ORBIS, as
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erator for its owners, the chance that a one-time payoff will ex-
ceed the present discounted future cash flows that will be
sacrificed due to bad behavior is virtually zero.
Second, because the operating conditions require ORBIS to
maintain no more than a minimal police force—probably no
more than that of a sleepy country hamlet in today’s developed
countries, both in size and function—it is not clear that ORBIS
would have the martial advantage necessary to impose its will on
its residents, even if it wished to do so.
The ultimate rationale for ORBIS is that, while monopoly in
the provision of ordinary goods and services is inadvisable, mo-
nopoly in the provision of law, order, and justice is pernicious. It
ought not to be tolerated if an alternative is possible. Hitherto,
no other model has been feasible because the raw coercive
power of modern states resulted in states outcompeting other
forms of governance. But with outer space, due to the unique
circumstances surrounding its status in public international law,
other models are feasible and may even be required. The eco-
nomic mechanisms embodied in the various sections and cove-
nants of the ORBIS lease show it is well positioned to serve as a
governance model for celestial settlement. It can thus serve as a
foundation for actual voluntary, contractual arrangements for
space settlements, when such settlements become technologi-
cally and economically feasible.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH OTHER MODELS
The ORBIS model has much to commend it. But arguments
about institutional efficacy are necessarily comparative. Even if
the ORBIS model works well, it would not be the preferred
choice for space settlement if alternative institutions work bet-
ter. In this section, the author argues that the two most likely
alternatives to private communities in space are either infeasible
or incapable of outperforming the ORBIS model. These two al-
ternatives are: (1) amending public international space law such
that states can take an active lead in promoting space settle-
ment; and (2) granting authority to public international institu-
tions, such as the United Nations, to oversee space settlement.
Because the author’s chief purpose is to highlight the potentials
of the ORBIS model, he will keep this section as brief as
possible.
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A. OPTION ONE: AMENDING THE CORPUS IURIS SPATIALIS
The simplest and most salient solution involves amending the
OST. If the problem is that the corpus iuris spatialis does not
permit the extension of territorial sovereignty to the celestial
bodies,94 why not simply amend the treaty to remove this provi-
sion or create a new treaty specifically focused on settlement?
States can obviously promote territorial expansion and coloniza-
tion—in fact, states may be too good at this, given terrestrial expe-
rience with state-sponsored colonization efforts—so the easiest
thing seems to be to give them the necessary legal authority.
Whether or not states are better at this than proprietary commu-
nities is debatable, but it is ultimately a secondary concern.
There will be no amendment of the OST to permit state-spon-
sored settlement efforts, because securing the requisite agree-
ment is simply too costly.95
The reason for this is straightforward. Because there is no in-
ternational super-sovereign, public international space law must
ultimately be self-enforcing.96 That is, it must be voluntarily ad-
hered to by the states that are parties to the various treaties. Fur-
thermore, this agreement would have to be unanimous, at least
among consenting nations. Thus, any change in the interna-
tional legal framework governing space would require unani-
mous consent among party states.97 Many of the parties are not
in any meaningful sense spacefaring nations, meaning they have
nothing to gain politically by revoking the ban on territorial ex-
tension of jurisdiction.98 And even the spacefaring nations—
chiefly the United States, Russia, and China—may find the pros-
pect of a renewed “space race,” this time for resources and terri-
tory, unsettling.99 Because any proposed change to public
international space law would create disproportionate benefits
for some states, those states that do not share in the benefits
have political reasons to reject them.
94 Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the Current
Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 345, 358 (1995).
95 Alan Wasser, A Better Way to Promote Space Settlement in our Lifetimes, SPACE REV.
(Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/219/1 [https://perma
.cc/AL4G-XVFW].
96 Salter, Other Space Race, supra note 7, at 5.
97 Id. at 18.
98 Cf. Tanja Masson-Zwaan, Symposium on the New Space Race: New States in Space,
113 AJIL UNBOUND 98, 102 (2019).
99 Salter, Other Space Race, supra note 7, at 6.
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This is not just idle speculation; failure to achieve concur-
rence in international treaties pertaining to space has already
occurred. The most famous example is the 1979 Moon Agree-
ment.100 The Moon Agreement is a failed treaty. While it stipu-
lates many changes to the principles governing the use of outer
space, it is ultimately toothless because it was signed by none of
the major spacefaring nations.101 This was chiefly due to Article
11, which states that the “moon and its natural resources are the
common heritage of mankind . . . .”102 This is no mere rhetori-
cal flourish: in international law, “common heritage of man-
kind” is a specific legal principle that limits the use of defined
territorial areas.103 In this context, states have a reasonable ex-
pectation that this language meant the use of the moon, includ-
ing its surface territory and natural resources, was off-limits to
states104 except with the explicit permission of other states. The
few nations that had, or could feasibly have, access to the moon
obviously had no interest in subordinating their activities to
those states that had no such ability. This explains why the
United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and many mem-
ber states of the European Space Agency did not sign.105
Thus, there is precedent for significant proposed changes in
the corpus iuris spatialis to fail because they are not consistent
with state parties’ interests. Given the current international legal
context, and especially considering the renewed competition be-
tween the United States, Russia, and China in space-related mat-
ters, the required changes to space law necessary for states to
support settlement efforts are extremely unlikely.106
B. OPTION TWO: DELEGATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY
That leaves one other option: states grant to a public interna-
tional authority, most likely the United Nations, the right to
100 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon
Agreement].
101 Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the
Shadows?, SPACE REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/
1954/1 [https://perma.cc/UH7C-WU95]. France and India are signatories. Id.
102 Moon Agreement, supra note 100, art. 11(1).
103 Harminderpal Singh Rana, The “Common Heritage of Mankind” & The Final
Frontier: A Revaluation of Values and the International Legal Regime for Outer Space
Activities, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 225, 229–30 (1994).
104 Tepper, Exploitation of Space Resources, supra note 17, at 2.
105 Listner, supra note 101.
106 See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 16, at 76–77.
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oversee space settlement programs. Within the United Nations,
an organization could be set up, perhaps under the auspices of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS),107 that either directly conducts celestial settlement
or grants authority to parties to establish such settlements, while
actively overseeing and regulating them.108 While this proposal,
and those similar to it, are not without a touch of the heroic and
romantic—as are many large-scale proposals for collective ac-
tion, oftentimes to humanity’s loss—it too runs afoul of insur-
mountable difficulties. The first is the same problem as outlined
in section 4.A of this Article. The United Nations would need to
acquire the authority to oversee any settlement activities,
whether direct or indirect. It only can acquire that authority
from the voluntary consent of member states. But states have
political reasons to withhold that consent for the reasons ex-
plored above.109
Even if member states consented to such an arrangement,
there are inherent problems with these kinds of governance so-
lutions that put them at a disadvantage versus modes of private
governance, of which ORBIS is an example. The managerial ar-
rangements practiced by authorities of this kind are bureaucratic:
they are hierarchical, like private companies, but do not exist in
a market context.110 As such, they cannot make use of market
prices, and thus profit and loss, as an aid in making their deci-
sions.111 This has profound implications for the incentives pub-
lic governance agents face, as well as the information they have
at their disposal. To begin, because bureaucrats do not operate
in an organization that is a residual claimant on its mandate,
they do not have the same incentives to control costs.112 In fact,
if they are allocated their funds by some other authority, as
many bureaucracies are, they have an incentive to exhaust their
107 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index
.html [https://perma.cc/BV79-XDTD] (last visited June 14, 2019).
108 Wasser & Jobes, supra note 16, at 76–77.
109 See id.
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TULLOCK 280, 296 (Charles K. Rowley ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1965); see also
William A. Niskanen, The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 293
(1968).
111 See LUDWIG VON MISES, OMNIPOTENT GOVERNMENT: THE RISE OF THE TOTAL
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budget, which is cost-maximizing behavior.113 And because they
cannot use market prices to perform profit and loss calculations
as a means of ascertaining the efficacy of their rules and opera-
tions, they must adhere rigidly to fixed procedures as a substi-
tute, which are necessarily less flexible in the face of changing
circumstances.114 For-profit organizations can adjust procedures
when market signals tell them they are no longer effectively ser-
vicing customers. If ORBIS experiences a fall in demand for resi-
dence, and thus declining rental income, it can experiment with
alternative governance strategies. This can alter both the cost
and revenue side of its balance sheet until the market gives it
reliable feedback, via a more favorable bottom line, that it has
found a solution in the interests of its residents. A bureaucratic
solution to the governance problems associated with space set-
tlement cannot use this tatonnement process, precisely because
it is a non-market organization. One result that can, and fre-
quently does, follow in bureaucratic organizations is that various
alternative metrics for success are put forth. But these other
metrics, whether drawn from ideological or interest-based no-
tions—recalling the quote from the ORBIS lease in Section III
of this Article115—will not equally appeal to different bureau-
cratic stakeholders. Thus, interest groups, each in favor of run-
ning the bureaucracy according to their preferred goal, emerge
and impair the function of the organization because they now
have two avenues for achieving success: allocating resources to
advancing their preferred goal, and allocating resources to im-
peding rival interest groups’ advancement of theirs. In contrast,
the shareholders of ORBIS have an easy exit option if they be-
lieve the community is no longer being governed in a profit-
maximizing manner: sell their ownership stake (and, if the op-
tion is available, start selling short).
To summarize, the problems with bureaucracies (public hier-
archies) as opposed to corporate proprietary communities (pri-
vate hierarchies) can be stated in accordance with the economic
mechanisms from Section II of this Article. Bureaucracies have
no residual claimants. Thus, they do not have the incentive to
cut costs nor the information necessary to do so, since their out-
put is not priced in a competitive market. As such, they do not
have the ability to provide the bundle of club goods associated
113 Id. at 330.
114 Id. at 329–30.
115 MacCallum, A Model Lease for ORBIS, supra note 63, at 5 n.6.
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with good governance. They can try to provide some goods they
anticipate will have club-like qualities, but they will not know
whether the current mix actually satisfies consumer demand or
whether the current mix is being produced in a least-cost man-
ner. They also do not lend themselves to a quick and low-cost
dispute resolution mechanism. Instead, dispute resolution,
much like public courts today, will be imprecise and slow. This is
due to the absence of cost consciousness on the part of bureau-
crats, as well as the heavy reliance on formal procedures that are
cumbersome and not well situated to deal with the nuances of
particular conflicts. Lastly, the monocentric nature of bureau-
cratic authority precludes the possibility of competing organiza-
tions, and thus the prospects for Tiebout and pseudo-Tiebout
competition to discipline the behavior of the bureaucracy are
practically nonexistent.
Admittedly, this overview of the problems with bureaucratic
governance was brief. But the problems identified in this section
have ample support, both theoretically and empirically, from
the vast literature on political economy and nonmarket decision
making. Given the legal problems with permitting existing states
to spearhead space settlement, and given the economic
problems with permitting international bureaucracy to oversee
space settlement, the best remaining option is the private com-
munity model, of which ORBIS is an exemplar.
V. CONCLUSION: SO, WHAT SHOULD STATES DO?
The author has argued that, due to international treaties lim-
iting the extension of state jurisdiction and sovereignty to the
celestial bodies, the most feasible model for space settlement is
one of voluntary, privately owned and operated communities.
Furthermore, there are several economic mechanisms that lead
us to conclude these proprietary communities will deliver good
governance: rules and procedures for peaceful living that meet
the demands of resident-consumers. The author analyzed a hy-
pothetical lease for a celestial proprietary community, the
ORBIS lease, and showed how its provisions and covenants em-
body the principles of residual claimancy, club goods provision,
peaceful dispute resolution, and sorting. This demonstrates the
ORBIS lease is a valid model for the governance of future space
settlements.
Nonetheless, it remains true that states are the primary actors
in space, and thus there are questions about what states should
do in light of the prospects of private space settlement. Here, we
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return to the OST, this time focusing on Article VI. The relevant
portion reads, in part: “The activities of non-governmental enti-
ties in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by
the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”116 This suggests a pro-
ductive role for states in overseeing private space settlement, in
a manner that does not amount to their assertion of de facto or
de jure jurisdiction in space. States can perform an important
function by setting minimum standards and qualifications for
celestial proprietary communities. These communities will al-
most certainly be governed under the auspices of a profit-seek-
ing corporation, and these corporations must be incorporated
somewhere. The United States, for example, could release a
clear list of standards and qualifications that for-profit celestial
communities must meet before they are granted corporate sta-
tus and before any claims are permissible for adjudication in a
U.S. court (U.S. courts hearing cases involving celestial commu-
nities does not imply territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are
not conferring and enforcing titles to real property).
The model here is one of indirect monitoring. After setting
up the initial “rules of the game,” in the form of conditions re-
quired for celestial corporate entities to be recognized under
U.S. law, the government should restrict itself to oversight
rather than actively managing the affairs of these communities.
As an example, the government could require corporate celes-
tial communities to post bonds as collateral against potential
damages payments to residents and require corporate celestial
communities to disclose crucial operational information to re-
sidents in a timely manner. Of course, as we have seen, proprie-
tary communities have an incentive to perform these functions
on their own. Thus, the role of the state in this case will be one
of a watchdog rather than a traditional regulator.
In addition, states can and should make regular reports con-
cerning their celestial proprietary communities, or rather the
corporate entity, to the appropriate international organizations,
such as the United Nations. By disclosing information to other
states in these venues, states have a forum for dialogue concern-
ing their respective corporations that operate private communi-
ties in space. This oversight function is in compliance with the
“authorization and continuing supervision” clause of OST Arti-
116 OST, supra note 10, art. VI.
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cle VI.117 Furthermore, there is wide leeway in how states per-
form this function, since Article VI is not self-executing.118 This
is a feature, not a bug. Instead of a clumsy, one-size-fits-all re-
quirement, states can and should approach the oversight and
disclosure issues concerning their celestial corporate entities in
a manner that adheres both to the letter and spirit of the OST,
while also being alterable as dialogue between states concerning
space matters unfolds.
Our experience with states over the last few centuries shows
that states best contribute to the common good not when they
are active micromanagers but background enforcers of basic
rules. When considering the prospects for extraterrestrial
human communities, it is appropriate that the state adopt an
even more restrained role. But restrained is not synonymous
with unimportant. States still have a crucial function to perform
in fostering international peace and cooperation, which is one
of the background conditions necessary for functional celestial
communities. What the author has argued here is that, referenc-
ing the ORBIS lease as a model, private communities can and
should perform many of the governance functions that previ-
ously were the state’s purview. This frees up public sector re-
sources to focus on what the state is best at: serving as a
sometime referee and arbitrator rather than an active player or
partisan. Prudent and restrained oversight by states in a few key
areas can enable private celestial communities to thrive.
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